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Similarly, Wieck's investigation of possible specific links between Daniel Webster's 
1825 Bunker Hill speech, Parker's Rights of Man sermon, and Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address is not completely unproblematic. One cannot help but wonder whether the 
use by Webster and Parker of (fairly) similar images of strength really merits mention 
in Wieck's book: what can one learn from Webster referring to the country as a 'mon-
ument' and Parker to God as a 'pyramid' (171)? Moreover, what is the lesson to be 
derived from all three men referring to 'our fathers,' all three employing forms of the 
word 'noble,' not to speak of all three invoking God towards the end of their orations 
(in all fairness, Wieck notes that many orators of the time asked the blessing of God)? 
To be sure, Wieck does not draw many conclusions from these circumstances, nor 
from the fact that each of the three speakers used triple formulations toward the end 
of their speeches (170). So, too, we may add, does Wieck himself in closing his own 
argument, referring on the last page of his conclusion to 'the dream Daniel Webster 
held high ... ; the dream to which Theodore Parker made such a powerful appeal. .. ; 
the dream to which Lincoln himself was turning ... ' (178). Finally, the circumstance 
that both Parker and Lincoln in ' [sleeking guidance with regard to the future ... were 
harking back to the fathers as the best sources of direction in confronting the 
unknown (173),' hardly establ ishes a particularly strong link between the two, besides 
their being Americans: in the words of Richard Hofstadter, after all, 'the United 
States was the only country in the world that began with perfection and aspired to 
progress.' 
These minor matters should not, however, detract from the importance of Wieck's 
work: overall, he has successfully managed to 'unlock a door that has effectively 
been sealed for almost a century and a half, in order to bring the reader face-to-face 
with a heretofore hidden Lincoln' (11). As Wieck himself acknowledges, in this 
essay-like little book his has not been the task to fully open that door; in lhe future 
however, Wieck's discovery of Lincoln's sympathies for Parker 's thinking may well 
inspire full-scale reinterpretations of the relationship between Lincoln 's day-to-day 
pragmatism and his higher ideals. 
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Professor Bjerre-Poulsen's book on the emergence of the American Right could 
hardly have been bette r timed. The conservative political philosophy that has facili-
tated Republican triumphs since Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 seems to have 
become hegemonic. Despite C linton's victories in two presidential elections drning 
the 1990s, there was no realignment, no c lear shift back to a Democratic majority. 
Indeed, it could be argued that however personally successful Clinton may have been, 
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the Democratic Party as a whole suffered under his watch. Despite the turn-around of 
lhe economy - a deve lopment popularly credi ted to Clinton but j ust as likely lhe 
result of policies engineered by Federa l Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan - the 
Democrats could not hold on to the While House in 2000. Even more disturbing to the 
liberal forces was the loss of the Democratic majority in Congress. The Republicans 
se ized control of both houses of Congress in 1994 - for U1e fi rst time since 1949, and 
they have managed to hold on to the ir Congressional majo1ity for two complete elec-
tion cycles (albeit with a brief loss in 2001-2003 of the ir maj ority in the Senate due to 
Senator Jeffords swi tch in party affiliation). Furthermore since George W. Bush's 
election in 2000, we have been witness to an ever sharper Right turn, especially in 
foreign policy as Bush has asserted American unilateralism in regard to pol icy issues 
on everything from missile defense systems to the global wanning treaty to the Inter-
national Court and, finally, to the war with Iraq. 
Suddenly the media and journals of opinion across the western world are abuzz: 
what's happened lo the USA? Alain Frachon, who w1ites about foreign affairs on the 
editorial page of Le Monde, is fairly typical when he exclaims 'No one told us that the 
Republicans had moved this far to the right. ' The widespread ignorance on the part of 
the European media to what have bee n the underlying realities of American pol itics 
for some time is just one good reason for journalists and students of American life to 
have a look al Professor Bjerre-Poulsen's book. In fact, the rise or the American Right 
has been far too li ttle studied, even in the United States - an observation made ten 
years ago by Professor Alan Brinkley. 1 
In a sense Bjerre-Poulsen takes up Brinkley's challenge - though Brinkley had called 
for a major reassessme nt of conservativism and indeed of the inte llectual and cultural 
foundations of the American political tradition and beyond that of modernity itself. In 
contrast, Bjerrc-Poulsen's key assumption is that lhe intellectual and cultural implica-
tions of conservati ve thought - which he rather dismissive ly lumps with its ' social 
psychology' - can be separated from the issues and political organizing that made 
possible the conservatives ' rise to power. One consequence or limi ting the scope of 
the study in this way is apparent in the author 's ambiguity regard ing the origin and 
prime motivations of conservative tho ught: ls it rooted in a reaction to the New Deal 
or in vehement anti-communism? Is i t a ' real' conservatism or I 91h century laissez-
faire liberalism dressed up in new clothing? To these obvious questions, 1 would add 
the fo llowing: J\rc lhe undeniable contradictions in American conservatism a conse-
quence of its particular nature, or in this respect does conservatism parallel a s imilar 
tendency in American liberalism to li ve wiU1 and exploit contrad iction?2 Another 
conseque nce of the author 's decision lo avoid a wider discussion of the intellectual 
foundations of the conservative movement is a manifest unwillingness to address the 
logic and sentiment behind conservatism's undeniable appeal to many American 
I. Alan Brinkley, ' The Problem of American ConservaJism,' American Historical Re1•ie11\ 99 (April. 
J 994). 409-429. 
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from American Politics: Tile Promise ofDisllar111011y (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univers ity Press, 198 1). 
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voters. Surely this must be one of the most pressing of questions on the minds of 
readers - and addressing it might well provide the opportunity to comment on the cur-
rent trajectory of liberalism. 
Having said all this, one must say in defense of Professor Bjerre-Poulsen that no book 
can do everything. And judged on its own terms as an account of the ' political mobi-
lization ' of the conservative Right in the USA, Bjerre-Poulsen has given us a splendid 
book - one that is thoroughly researched and impressively learned. Righi Face 
gathers, presents and synthesizes a vast array of conservative literatme while re-
counting and analyzing on-going debates that characterized the movement between 
1945 and 1965. By paying close attention to the actual debates among conservative 
political thinkers and journalists, RiRht Face yields a strong sense of immediacy. The 
hook plunges us back into the world of the 1950s and 1960s, taking us back to a time 
when the ideas and values of New Deal liberalism still dominated American politics 
and when many, perhaps most, conservatives saw themselves as a saving remnant -
people with a conscience unlike ly ever to have power. On the whole and by contrast 
to the conservatives, Republicans positioned themselves as ' moderates' - moderate 
liberals that is: fiscally cautious but socially progressive. To anyone who has normal-
ized the tem1s of American politics today - where New York State often votes in the 
minority, and a President could be elected in 2000 on the strength of electoral votes 
from the South and the Rocky Mountain states alone - the lost world of American 
politics will come as a shock. Bjerre-Poulsen brings that world to us, recoun ting a 
time when politicians from the big eastern and middle western states still dominated 
both political parties and the ideological conservatives were a distinct minority in the 
Republican Party. Barry Goldwater 's 1964 nomination is the culmination of the auda-
cious thin.king on the part of the conservati ve strategists who would re-write the rules 
and ideological boundaries of American politics. It also stands as the climactic 
episode of B jerre-Pou I sen 's narrative. 
A conservative and rather undistinguished Senator from Arizona who was talked into 
running for president, Goldwater 's candidacy ultimately fa iled (he was overwhelm-
ingly defeated by President Johnson in 1964). Yet by merely securing the Republican 
nomination, Goldwater 's candidacy was an enormous success. Party regulars were 
stunned by what they must have experienced as a coup d'etat brought off by the con-
servatives - a movement that had organized itself outside of the Republican Party and 
had been given little chance of success by the political pundits. Goldwater's rad ical 
acceptance speech (in which he eschewed the usual practice of holding out an olive 
branch to the defeated Party faction), his choice of an ideological double as a running 
mate, and his refusal to tone down his right wing rhetoric as the e lection approached 
assured his defeat as many Republican politicians and voters abandoned the Party 
ticket and endorsed Johnson. Liberal and moderate Republicans were free to do so, of 
course, but the larger victory would come to the conservatives. Even at the time, in 
the wake of a crushing defeat that seemed to verify the moderate Republicans' claim 
to the Party, astute observers understood the significance of the Goldwater move-
ment. William Buckley, founde r of the National Review, pointed out that without the 
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Goldwater candidacy 'our opportunity to proselyte on a truly national scale would not 
exist. ' And Congressman Bob Dole felt liberated by the ascension of Goldwater, 
remarking that he could now evoke conservative principles openly. In a short time, 
tried and true liberal vote-getting phrases like 'tax and spend ' would be turned by 
conservatives into slogans of reproach. 
Bjcrre-Poulscn shows us how the Goldwater nomination anticipated several under-
lying factors that were transforming American poli tics - and society - including a 
geographical shift of power away from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and 
West, the re-emergence of (the formerl y left-oriented) populism as a right-wing ten-
dency c1itical of the liberal welfare state, and the opening of the political party in the 
wake of extra-party organization - what many observers still call a 'democratizing' of 
the party that wrested control from party professionals in favor of well seasoned oper-
atives from conservative organizations that knew how to raise money. Of these llu·ee 
factors, the geo-strategic shift in American politics is the most evident. F. Clifton 
White, who organized the Goldwater campaign for the nomination, was the firs t 
advocate of a southern strategy which wasn't widely talked about until the 1968 
Nixon campaign. It seems obvious enough now, but at the time the not ion that you 
would focus on securing the southern states first seemed ridiculous; indeed up until 
1968 it could be argued that almost every American election since Lincoln 's in 1860, 
had hinged on the Northeast-Midwest combination. Obviously the change came as 
population - and electoral votes - began shifting south and west, but it took a change 
in thinking to exploit the new situation. 
The conservatives' success also rested on new met110ds of political organizing based 
on a tactically sound decision to position their movement as independent of, and yet 
focused on, capturing the Republican Party. Commenting on Lhe necessity of keeping 
an independent ideological and organizational profile, editor of the National Review 
William Rusher told a conservative gathering in 1960 that American political parties 
were 'nothing more than vote gathering machines.' Unl ike DSOC (the Democratic 
Social ist Organizing Committee), which linked itself to e lements of the Democratic 
Party and a couple of trade unions, the conservatives were never dependent on the 
Republican Party - or any other mainstream organization. By inventing the by now 
well known direct mail fund-raising technique and maintaining a large contributor 
base, the conservatives re-invented American politics - and this, coming j ust as the 
organizing effectiveness of the Democratic party was falling, helps explain the ri se of 
the American Right. This is one of the most useful discussions in Bjerre-Poulsen's 
story. 
Finally, the study of a political ideology should always raise the question of the sui t-
ability of that ideology for the tasks of governance - given the hi storical and institu-
tional restraints on the success of that ideology. The mechanisms of the modern state 
- the relation between corporate and slate power, the development of liberal in terest-
group politics, the structure of cooperati ve federalism - were a ll subject to critique by 
the growing conservative movement which, as Bjeffe-Poulscn points out, was itself 
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divided between radical reactionaries whose backward vision often drew on the prin-
c iples of the old republic and an adaptive libertarian wing that privileged the 'free 
market.' As Bjerre-Poulsen explains, both elements were necessary to the growth of 
the conservative movement - though the contradictions between them were so severe 
for many years that the leading journal of the movement, the National RevieH1, spon-
sored a semi-official 'fusionist ' position designed lo hold the movement together. The 
National Review became the voice of a self-appointed 'sane' and respectable conser-
vatism, effectively purging the movement of its most extreme e lements - those like 
Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, who saw a communist conspiracy 
deep inside the ran.ks of the American political class. In effect, what Bjerre-Poulscn's 
work points the way toward is a larger study of prec:isely how the conservative move-
ment prepared itself for taking power. Bjcrre-Poulsen has given us one part of that 
narrative of preparation - as the politically and institutionally dysfunctional elements 
of conservatism were weeded out to produce an ideology that, despite being contra-
dictory and unpalatable to many, could in fact permit its adherents to govern. 
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In the Preface to his book Daniel Ellsberg stales that 'the focus of this memoir' (viii) 
was the background of his decision to copy and make public the top secret study later 
known as The Pe111agon Papers (hereafter 711e Papers). The focus, however, has a 
wide lens and captures three subjects: the personal story; the case of The Papers; and 
the system of secrecy and lying at the top of the executive branch of government. 
I 
In describing the events, atmospheres, and analyses that resulted in his fateful deci-
sion, Ellsberg narrates his transformation from a cold-war warrior to a Vietnam dove, 
becoming perhaps the 20th century's most famous American whistle blower. Millions 
of Americans experienced the same transformation, many of them earlier and more 
quickly, but few if any had Ellsberg's wealth of fi rst-hand information. 
Ellsberg's decision to copy and give to the New York Times the seven thousand-page 
study of decision-making regarding Vietnam led to a fedP-rnl court-order to stop pub-
lication. The court order was the first-ever under the constitution. David Rudensline 
documents well Urnt story 's importance in his The Day the Presses Stopped: A Histo1y 
of the Pentagon Papers Case (1 996). Wi thin the White House, Ellsberg's decision lo 
leak to the press led to illegal wiretaps and to the creation of a secret team, later 
known as the Plumbers, to prevent future leaks. Jn an attempt to discredit Ellsberg 
and discourage would-be whistle blowers, the Plumbers burglarized the office of 
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. On June 17, 1972 police arrested some of the Plumbers in the 
